git ssb

%oDcN+0dus8WD7J985vjOmewyftoIN9/8j2GrtG3Guck=.sha256

{
  "previous": "%mTROFT1mcDuzu6sJbjJTjCgZPkJPHgoenEl8UKnKO1I=.sha256",
  "author": "@EMovhfIrFk4NihAKnRNhrfRaqIhBv1Wj8pTxJNgvCCY=.ed25519",
  "sequence": 2729,
  "timestamp": 1466312652183,
  "hash": "sha256",
  "content": {
    "type": "post",
    "root": "%nYgIAzAS2rJI+t8CDti1R6J3lxkZRBt7XqqXr2sm+L0=.sha256",
    "branch": "%nYgIAzAS2rJI+t8CDti1R6J3lxkZRBt7XqqXr2sm+L0=.sha256",
    "text": "All the defences against sybil attacks basically boil down to making it \"too expensive\" to create a sybil swarm. Basically, finding some way to create a \"real cost\" to creating an identity in the system.\nBitcoin does this with proof of work, because processors & electricity are expensive. Ethereum enables you to do this with money. Often, centralized services require you to confirm your phone number (using the price of simcards).\n\nThe other method is to do some kind of network analysis. This is broadly the approach that ssb uses - here independent parties post \"follow\" messages which bring that peer into your network. https://www.stellar.org/ is anothe example of this approach.\nFor a voting system, you could have each peer state who they accept the votes of, and discount peers that are not strongly connected to yourself. This is based on the assumption that it would be difficult to for an attacker to trick many people into expressing \"trust\" in them. This would require people being educated to take that expression fairly seriously, though.\n\nMaybe, if a sybil swarm did sneak in, and made a reckless proposal, the rest could sever their network from those sybils - just succeed.\n\nOf course, all of these approaches should probably be considered unproven...",
    "mentions": []
  },
  "signature": "aezWRZtZAUZGZHVz+e2mQs6RtT/+cx2XzvMX5pQVJy2a7FlUvivJtMjDxeik8NmR4X9bS7JIjwNxgd5XxlX6AA==.sig.ed25519"
}